


Blind Baselines Beat Membership Inference Attacks for Foundation Models

Debeshee Das, Jie Zhang, Florian Tramèr

1. Membership Inference Attack






Members



Non-Members

3. Blind Attack Baseline





Members



Non-Members

Date Detection

Bag of Words Classifier Greedy Rare Word Selection

4. Case Study Results

MI Dataset	Metric	Best Reported MIA(%)	Ours (%)
Dataset 1	TPR@5%FF	PR 43.2	94.7
Dataset 2	AUC ROC	88.0	91.4
Dataset 3	AUC ROC	79.6	79.9
Dataset 4	AUC ROC	74.5	75.3
Dataset 5	TPR@1%FF	PR 5.9	10.6
Dataset 6	TPR@1%FF	PR 2.5	2.7
Dataset 7	TPR@1%FF	PR 2.5	8.9
Dataset 8	TPR@1%FF	PR 18.8	55.1

2. MIA on Foundation Models

Constructing a post-hoc MIA Evaluation Dataset:



Vision Models

Members: Dataset A



(with some debiasing post-processing)

Non-Members:

Dataset B



LLMs


Members:

Before Cutoff



Model Cutoff

Non-Members:



Are these datasets really IID?

5. Conclusion

- 1. Members and non-members of post-hoc MIA datasets can be reliably distinguished by simple blind attacks
- 2. Current evaluations of MI attacks for foundation models cannot be trusted
- 3. Datasets with IID train-test split like The Pile and DataComp should be used for MIA Evaluation